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Abstract. The paper deals with two aspects: the public ownership of intellectual property rights and the holding of 
the title (individuals vs institutions) for the public financed research. 
A key problem in the past and still now in Europe has been the low transfer of results coming from public research 
to industrial users. Recently a new trend developed which favours the patenting of the scientific results of public 
actors. This change partly comes from the modification of the public funding mechanism of allocation and goes 
with changes in the regulation and regime related to the ownership of intellectual property rights.  
The paper is built on a pilot study, which controlled if and how the modification in national regulation affected the 
actors’ behaviour. It is based on a survey of public inventors, in two public institutions (Cnr and Roma 1 
University) who disclosed their inventions to the institutions in the last three years; on interviews with the 
responsible persons of the patent offices in the two institutions and on some data from the Cnr 2005 patent 
portfolio. 
This pilot study on public patenting in Italy seems to confirm the persistence of the academic incentives in the 
patenting activities of the public research institutions, even in presence of the 2001 patenting regime, aimed to 
assign IPR title to the public inventors. 
Furthermore the results highlight the presence of a relation between public institutions and firms that are not 
completely captured by the patenting indicators. Patents are only the emerging part of a more large hidden area of 
relationship s between public institutions and industrial firms. 
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Introduction 
relevant problem in the past was and 
still is the narrow transfer of research 
results to industrial users. Recently an 
orientation finalised to modifying some 
institutional aspects (regulation and internal 
organization within public research institutions) 
gained place for improving the on going situation. 
The trajectory followed by the various European 
countries was different. In Germany in 1998 a 
new regulation assigned the title of inventions 
produced within the research funded by the State 
to the public research organizations, but the 
privilege granted to professors was abolished only 
in 2001. The present legislation defines the 
professors’ inventions as a service belonging to 
Universities. As an effect of the new regulation 
the public research institutions are reorganising 
themselves for sustaining the patenting of 
invention realised by their employees. In France 
Universities have enjoyed since a long time the 
title of the inventions realised by their professors. 
A recent Chart on Intellectual Property in Public 
Research Institutes and University nevertheless 
reinforced this opportunity, pointing out to these 
organizations the legal duty of protecting and 
exploiting inventions produced by their 
employees. In Italy the law 383/2001 established 
(art 7) a revising of the provisions related to the 
statute of civil employees of the State and 
established the recognition of the IPR title to the 
University’s and to the public research 
institutions’ employees for their own inventions.  
This legislative innovation produced different 
reactions: apparently appreciation by industry 
(Cesaroni e Piccaluga, 2002), debate and 
criticism within the scientific environment. 
More recently (2005) Italian Government has 
introduced a new legislative act (D.L.30/2005 
art 65), which leaves to the public researchers 
the IPR entitlement only in the case of research 
financed with core intra-institutional fund, while 
in all the other cases of contract fund the 
ownership is attributed to their public employer. 
In the meanwhile, between 2001 and 2005, 
public institutions have elaborated internal 
regulation, which leaves to their employee-
researchers a large range of options 
How much do these institutional changes 
impact on the propensity of professors and 
public researchers to patent? Which are the 
mechanisms favouring individual patenting? 
How much do they modify the incentives of the 
scientific system or how much do they represent 
a specific incentive to realise patentable 
inventions? 
The economic literature dealt with these 
aspects without arriving to a convergent result. 
Studies on the effect of the new regulation in 
US, the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, which assigned 
the IPR title to the Universities and public 
research institutions on inventions coming out 
the research activity financed by public funds 
and the Stevenson–Wydler Technology 
Innovation Act, in the same year, which 
explicitly attributed to the public laboratories the 
technology transfer mission, to be realised 
through the creation of dedicated technology 
transfer (TT) structures (Jaffe, 2000) have in 
some case put into evidence a direct relation 
between these institutional innovations and the 
increase in public patenting in US (Trajtenberg 
et al., 1997). In other cases this increase was 
considered independent and due to other factors, 
such as the growth of new research fields, where 
higher is the link between basic and applied 
research (Mowery et al., 1998). Some other 
studies considered that the quantitative growth 
of public patenting in US has not been always 
characterized by good quality (Henderson et al., 
1998); the public patenting increase could be 
attributed to the entry of newcomer universities 
in the patenting activity, with a result ing lower 
average quality of patent (Cesaroni and 
Piccaluga, 2002). 
Europe represents a less studied and lightly 
different case: the regulation to which public 
research institutions could refer themselves for 
ruling the IP entitlement of the internally 
realised inventions is older than the US one and 
in some case very old (Italy, R.D. 1127, June 29, 
1939). At the same time it had a low impact, in 
fact both in France and in Italy recent studies 
have put into evidence that, notwithstanding a 
low institutional public patenting, there is a 
more or less large (depending on scientific 
fields) phenomenon of public inventors, who 
realise patents in collaboration with firm and 
other partners (Balconi et al., 2002; Azagra-
Caro et al., 2004). The change at institutional 
A 
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level is more recent (end of 90’s) and partly 
driven by the new patent regulation, partly due 
to changes in the attitude of the same 
institutions, under the pressing push of giving a 
justification of the public research funding in 
terms of direct contribution to the productivity 
and competitiveness of the economic system 
(Geuna, 2001). 
This study can be considered a first step of a 
more complex programme of research, not only 
because at present it is limited in its extension, 
but also because at present it doesn’t take into 
consideration in a more detailed way the 
specific local applications of the patent 
regulation change, which probably has a more 
direct effect on researchers behaviour. Our study 
is focused on individual researchers and at 
present has the aim of verifying the impact of 
the new regulation in relation to three aspects: 
the diffusion of information on the general 
patent regulation and on its “local” applications, 
within a sample of public inventors, verifying at 
the same time the relation between patenting 
and being informed on regulation; verifying the 
presence of a more entrepreneurial attitude 
among public inventors and the institutional and 
individual factors which characterise it; 
verifying the relation between the new incentive 
(IPR title to researchers) and scientific 
incentives. At present we consider only two 
public institutions (one University and a public 
research institution), both multidisciplinary: the 
University La Sapienza (Roma 1), with one of 
the larger Italian university patent assets and one 
of the first to have introduced a Patent Office 
(1999) and launched an internal policy of 
patenting promotion; the National Research 
Council, the Italian public institution with the 
richer patent portfolio (Cesaroni and Piccaluga, 
2002). We take into consideration a three years 
period, 2001-2003, when the new 2001 patent 
regulation starts to be applied. Given the short 
time after the introduction of the new patent 
regulation, of course, our study doesn’t take into 
consideration the public  patenting trend for 
finding out a relation with the new regulation; 
moreover it doesn’t study the impact of the State 
regulation on the behaviour of the public 
institutions through some cost function, neither 
the new patent regulation impact on the 
individuals’ economic compensation.  
The paper is organised as following: in the 
paragraph 1 we pay attention to the main aspects 
of the 2001 Italian patent law and to its 
application regime in the two institutions 
(University Roma 1 and Cnr); in paragraph 2 we 
consider the historical trend of the patent 
portfolio of both the public institutions; in the 
next paragraph we introduce research questions 
and empirical results from the socio-economic 
literature; in paragraph 4 we introduce the 
sample; the other two paragraphs deal with 
results: in the 5th descriptive statistics and in the 
6th a factor and cluster analysis are presented; 
finally we give our conclusion and indicate 
future research lines.  
1. The new regulation on public patent  
in Italy 
In Italy the legal reference which ruled the 
intellectual property rights in public institutions 
until 2001 was the R.D. 1127/1939 (the Italian 
law on industrial patents) and in particular the 
art 34. This legislative article assigned the IP 
title of invention realised by public employees 
to their public research institutions; public 
inventors, besides the right to be recognised as 
moral author of their invention, had the right of 
benefiting of a prime (“equo premio”) in case of 
patent commercialisation. The amount of this 
prime was established by the internal regulation 
of universities and public research institutions. 
A survey realised in the past on 155 research 
units, which had taken part into a finalised 
project1 (Poti’, Cesaroni, Cioppi, 1999) pointed 
out a diffused dissatisfaction with the patent 
regulation and its application by Cnr. Some 
researchers complained that Cnr institutes had 
scarce autonomy, in relation to the central 
administration, in managing patents, and the 
same for the researchers. It was complained the 
absence of practices of withdrawing by the 
public institution side, with the related 
possibility of access to the IPR title by public 
                                                                 
1 Finalised projects, managed by Cnr, have been an 
important source of public patents.  They still exist, but 
have been strongly curtailed. They last on average 5 
years, are organised in temporary research units, 
including university, public research institutions and 
industry, and deal with strategic research areas.  
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7 
researchers. Moreover some researchers 
sustained the necessity of introducing more 
economic incentives for the inventor, higher 
than the existing “equo premio”: the current 
incentive was considered too low. At that time 
following the CNR regulation the inventor 
received 20% of the gross economic return from 
the patent commercialisation. More largely it 
was complained the absence of investments 
dedicated by public research institutions to these 
activities, with a real support in the management 
and valorisation of the patent portfolio. It was 
said “patenting happens in a sort of empty 
space”. Also other aspects of weakness was 
lamented: the fact that the research fund of the 
finalised projects or the institutes were charged 
by the cost of patenting, instead of the Cnr 
central administration. Finally it was lamented 
that publications could circulate only after the 
patent. In sum, it was sustained that in the 
absence of a specific management and economic 
support, and of a real incentive, the researcher, 
even if favourably oriented toward translating 
research results in a more directly transferable 
form, above all if he was young, preferred 
publishing and ignored patenting. 
Italian law 383 (18/10/2001) innovates the 
pre-existent patent legal framework: in that one 
only a reference to Public administration was 
inserted, now a specific article is dedicated to 
patenting in public research institutions, 
differentiated from industrial research. 
Summarising, the new regulation provides that 
the  exclusive title of the proprietary rights 
deriving from patented inventions, realised 
within university and public research 
institutions, goes to the researcher. The 
researcher’s patrimonial rights are limited 
between 50% and 70% of the economic return 
from the commercial exploitation of the 
invention; the residual amount goes to university 
or public research institution, which, not 
enjoying any more IPR title, are relieved of the 
patent management cost. Inventor is charged of 
the expenditure and strategies dedicated to the 
patent exploitation. He has the duty of 
information toward his public employer. The 
law then refers to the public employer for the 
definition of all the other aspects about the 
relations with the researchers/inventors. Since 
the law referred the organization of the relations 
between public employer and researchers to a 
contractual definition, the offices of the public 
research institutions have formulated internal 
regulation to adapt their administrative action. 
Here we refer to the adaptation made by the two 
institutions considered in our study. Both 
provided to regulate the possibility of an IPR 
assignment by the inventor to the institution.  
The University Roma 1 provided two 
hypotheses of IPR assignment, ex ante and ex 
post to the patent application, for inventions 
realised within the University. After the positive 
evaluation of the proposal by its Patent Office, 
the University goes on with formalising the IPR 
acquisition at the following conditions: the 
inventor is charged by the irreversibility of the 
proposal, the duty of confidentiality; the 
commitment to present the patent application 
within a predefined deadline and the 
collaboration in the definition of the patent 
protection and exploitation. University is 
charged by patent protection, expenditures, 
marketing and transfer. In case of assignment 
asked after a patent application, the inventor 
who enjoys the IPR title can choose if going on 
with it or keeping the title and agreeing with 
University upon a contract of exclusive licence. 
In all these three alternatives University 
recognises to the inventor the right to 50% of 
the economic return (equo premio) from the 
patent exploitation, deducted its expenditures.  
If the researcher prefers to keep the IPR and 
to go on autonomously with the patent 
protection and exploitation, the University has 
the right to 40% of the economic return from the 
patent commercialisation. The new regulation, 
which introduces the purchase of a right from a 
private person, has produced a more cautious 
and selective behaviour on the Patent Office 
side, which in its turn has to justify more strictly 
its budget towards the University central 
administration. In the past the justification was 
first of all in terms of excellence (on the basis of 
sectoral studies) and lastly in terms of patent 
economic value; at present, with a structural 
lack of resources, the criteria of cost-benefit 
become more relevant. At the same time it 
becomes clear that patents are not a direct 
source of funds, but they have an economic 
value as property and a signal value, together 
with publications. Moreover they have an 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 10/2005 
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indirect economic effect, since patents attracts 
new research contracts.  
The new patent regime was applied by the 
University of Roma 1 since June 2002. 
At Cnr, inventors, who are employees, have 
two options: applying directly for a patent, 
keeping the IPR title and the related 
expenditures or drawing out an IPR assignment 
contract. If the inventor keeps the IPR title, 30% 
of his economic return from patent exploitation 
goes to the institution. The inventor is asked to 
take informed his institution, but of course there 
is the possibility of opportunistic behaviour and 
moral hazard between employee and public 
employer. The institution puts a limit to this 
risk, when establishes that the assignment has to 
be contracted before applying for a patent 
(assignment of a dawning right). Another limit 
to the risk of moral hazard comes from the fact 
that Cnr suggests the practice of receiving 
directly from the firm, which acquires a licence 
on an inventor’s patent, its quota on the firm’s 
economic return, without passing through the 
researcher. Moreover even if there is not an 
obligation of communication on the inventor 
side, the institutions can prosecute the 
researcher who doesn’t enforce the internal 
regulation. The new patent regime leaves then 
place to conflicts between institution and 
researcher and ask for trust commitment. 
Since 1995 Cnr institutes have been charged 
of the patent expenditures for the first three 
years and have to assure the first selection of 
patents. Even if at present there isn’t a quota 
from the patent’s economic return going to the 
Cnr institutes, there is a form of indirect return 
for them, through the research contract that are 
stipulated with industry at the moment of a 
licence agreement.  
The new regulation is adopted by Cnr since 
April 2003.  
 
Summarising, the present changes go in the 
direction of giving a range of choices to the 
inventor and a proactive patent policy to 
institutions. But at the same time they introduce 
more constraints: duty of confidentiality, 
responsibility of information, selection of the 
IPR assignment to be accepted, and on the side 
of the economic incentive changes ask for an 
assessment of the alternatives, together with the 
patent value and the efficiency of the internal 
TTO.  
A full assessment of the effects of the new 
regulation will be possible only in two-three 
years. At present our study takes into 
consideration only general aspects and 
specifically: the information of researchers on 
new regulation; a first assessment by the 
researchers; the more or less favourable 
propensity toward an entrepreneurial attitude. 
2. The patent portfolios: characters and 
evolution 
During the time Cnr have accumulated an 
important IPR portfolio and it to day collects 
around 298 patents (30/10/2004). As to a recent 
study (Abramo and Lucantoni, 2003) the 1982-
2001 patent portfolio represented 59.1% of 
patents registered by the whole Italian public 
research system. From 1996 to 2003 the total 
Cnr IPR portfolio (including patents, copyrights 
and others) went down from 618 to 419; this 
was due to the fact that since 2001 the 
institution has controlled and verified the state 
of its IPR property and left the IPRs taken for 
obsolete or without interest for industry. 
Nonetheless also the yearly flow of new patent 
deposits has a tendency to go down. The 
uncertainty due to the change in regulation in 
the more recent period 2002-2003 could explain 
the strong decrease in annual patent production 
in these two years. But the reduction of the 
patent production seems to be an “historical” 
characteristics of the institution: in the study to 
which we refer (Abramo et al., 2003) the 
authors make a comparison between the yearly 
average patent production in two periods and 
they find out that it slows down from 73 in 
1989-1995 to 43 in the period 1996-2001. The 
reduction is particularly relevant in patents 
deriving from research activity organised by 
finalised projects (see footnote 1). One of the 
reason of the slowing down seems therefore to 
lay in the continuous reduction of State fund to 
Cnr for finalised projects. The research 
expenditure for finalised projects in the two 
periods went down of -19%, while the ordinary 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 10/2005 
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research expenditure was reduced of -8%. But 
the slowing down of patent production was 
worse (-41%). Among the possible reasons, 
besides the two ones quoted above (slowing 
down of the State fund for finalised projects and 
of Cnr ordinary research expenditure), the 
authors refer to the new patent policy of the 
institution, which since 1995 decentralised the 
patent expenditure’s burden from the central 
administration to the institutes and finalised 
projects. This new policy should have created a 
competition in the resources allocation between 
research and patenting expenditure within 
institutes and finalised projects with an effect of 
disincentive to patent. This Cnr policy have had 
the aim of giving more decentralised 
responsibility in the selection of patent to 
research informed people. At present the Cnr 
institutes have an indirect benefit for their 
disclosure activity: in case of license contracts, 
automatically research contracts are established 
between the industry and the institute. A 
worsening of the transfer activity from the 
institution didn’t go with the historical slowing 
down of the yearly average patent production: 
the number of patent yearly transferred 
remained more or less the same. But this doesn’t 
indicate automatically that the quality of patents 
is better than before, since it could also be 
present an opposite phenomenon of loosing 
good patent inventors, together with the 
recurrent phenomenon of researchers 
abandoning CNR for University. Moreover an 
orientation to patenting “elsewhere” (with 
industry or abroad with public institutions) 
resulted from a previous study on a CNR 
finalised project. (Poti’ et al., 1999). What can 
be happened is a higher attention dedicated to 
the technology transfer mission by the 
institution. Anyway this issue asks for a specific 
investigation. 
An opposite phenomenon of patent growth or 
emersion characterised the University Roma 1. 
In 1999, when it was established, the patent 
office found the property of 34 patents. Until 
that moment no one patent had been transferred 
or commercially promoted. At the end of 2002 
the IPR portfolio (it doesn’t include copyrights) 
of Roma1 had 72 patents, which corresponds to 
a growth of 85% in the period (28% by year). In 
the same date patents in an on going transferring 
process were 21.  
While the motivation of the public 
researchers to patent is still mainly based on 
scientific incentives, the motivations of the 
administrative structures are mainly economic. 
In both cases the extension of the patent 
application abroad can amplify the expected 
results: larger recognition for the researchers 
and higher opportunity of economic return for 
the public institutions, through contracts with 
industry or royalties by licensing.  
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 1 - Cnr IPR portfolio: flows and stock 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
National patents* 39 29 46 42 39 63 20 21 
International extension of patents 9 11 8 13 18 14 19 19 
National IPR Portfolio 618 590 567 554 513 500 431 419 
Portfolio of internationally extended IPRs nd nd nd nd 101 112 125 125 
Yearly contracts 12 9 10 6 12 12 8 3 
Expenditure for IPR management (x1000) 358 361 359 413 413 413 413 413 
Revenue from IPR (x1000) 370 461 466 336 628 680 414 258 
*Only institutionally owned patents are included 
 
Source: Cnr/DAST  
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The patent international extension, 
nevertheless, didn’t become cross border 
licensing with a similar to public patenting 
intensity. A recent analysis of the Italian public 
patent commercialisation, through direct patent 
sale and (temporary) licenses, (Abramo and 
Pugini, 2004), in 44 universities and at Cnr, 
showed that the geographical proximity and, 
linked with that, the characteristics of the local 
environment, are predominant in the Public 
research system’s technology transfer. The 
(1999-2003) technology transfer was 
concentrated in the North of Italy regions. 
Neither the South of the country nor the 
international market and MNEs were the final 
buyers/licensees of the public patents. Other two 
interesting empirical results (even if on a more 
restricted number of examined cases) are that 
the main users of the technology transfer are 
national incumbent firms of medium-large size 
and that exclusive licenses predominate.  
3. Institutional changes and motivation of 
public inventors 
3.1 Institutional factors 
Empirical study on the determinants of patenting 
in the public research system devoted attention 
to institutional factors that can affect the 
propensity to patent in the public research 
institutions:  
- the disciplinary field 
- the institutional diversity (institution more or 
less research oriented) 
- TTO strategy 
- institution’s patent history 
- the source of funding (contract funding and 
within it the industrial contract funding) 
Patent activity is related to the field of 
specialization: in life science and engineering it 
is more frequent to apply for intellectual 
property right protection. Meyer Krahmer and 
Schmoch (1998) find out that some 
technological areas give higher opportunities to 
patent and innovate.  
The TTO is the administrative service created 
to manage and support the university inventions. 
The presence and role of a technology transfer 
office is fundamental, given the low awareness 
of patenting among public researchers. The 
effect can be different: it can encourage the 
disclosure of invention and the patent activity, 
but also, if highly selective in accepting 
inventions or conservative in contracting 
licenses, have a counter productive effect 
(Siegel et al., 1999). Some authors find that the 
size of the TTO matters positively (Folz et al., 
2000). Carlsson and Fridh (2002) explore the 
role of TTO in patenting and licensing in 12 US 
universities. They find that inventions depend 
on the year of creation of TTO and the number 
of staff, along with the total research 
expenditure.  
The institution’s experience in patenting has 
an effect on aggregated and individual higher 
propensity to patent (Stephan et al., 2004). 
Azagra-Caro, Carayol and Llerena (2003) 
have studied the effect of contractual funding by 
source on public patents (university owned and 
university invented but owned by industry) in a 
large University (Louis Pasteur) at laboratory 
level. Relation with industry and research 
funded by industry can support patent activities 
in the public research system. The authors find 
that contractual funding (public and private) has 
a positive influence on the generation of 
institutional patent, even after controlling by 
laboratory differences (size, discipline, 
institutional type). But when distinguishing 
contract fund by public and industrial source, 
university owned patent is less responsive to 
industrial fund, than university invented patent 
(owned by industry). 
3.2 Individual factors 
The analysis on patenting in public institutions 
in the socio-economic literature is mainly 
focused on institutional aspects, while the 
relation with individual researcher 
characteristics or the interplay between personal 
and institutional factors has been less explored. 
It has been studied mainly in relation to 
scientific publications. A different path has been 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N° 10/2005 
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followed by Stephan, Gurmu, Summel and 
Black (2004). The authors start from the 
hypothesis that patent can be a “logical outcome 
of research activity, that is designed first and 
foremost with an eye to publication”. Three 
factors can mostly encourage patenting:  
- a more applied oriented scientific 
environment: working in engineering faculty 
or technical university or in biomedical 
research can give research results both 
patented and published. In this case the 
patent can be viewed as a by product of 
publication, given the low marginal cost of 
producing a communication for the 
technology transfer office; 
- the interaction with industry, that can 
increase the interest and the opportunity to 
patent of public scientists; 
- the economic reward accompanying the 
patent protection of research findings 
through the technology transfer, even if 
economic returns from patenting is highly 
skewed. 
Other less prominent factors can also play a 
positive role in patenting orientation: 
- the academic visibility: patents confirm the 
novelty of the scientific results and attract 
industrial firms collaborations; 
- other return from the industry, such as the 
access to equipment. 
The disclosure of invention to their public 
institution and TTO by the scientists is 
constrained mainly by opportunity cost 
consideration (Thursby and Thursby, 2003) such 
as time to take away from research for being 
involved in licensing and development, because 
the researcher involvement is asked also for 
institution owned patents. Some of these 
constraints are due to “learning costs” and 
experience can help future disclosures. 
Given these pros and cons factors, some 
personal character can influence the propensity 
to patent of public scientists: age and cohort 
effect, career stage, scientific productivity.  
The hypothesis made by Stephan et al. (2003) 
are that incentive to do patentable research is not 
different from incentive to do publishable 
research, therefore the rate of patenting should 
decline with the age, following a trend similar to 
the age-publishing profile. At the same time this 
trend can be alleged by the career stage 
consideration: at the beginning of career there is 
the necessity of concentrating time on research 
activity, while late in career the scientist can 
allocate more time to activity that could produce 
additional revenue. Another factor that can 
alleged the life cycle effect on patenting come 
from the cohort effect: younger institutions 
could be more patent oriented, given an 
important recent change in academic culture.  
The results from a multivariate cross section 
analysis (patent equation in Stephan et al., 
2003), including institutional and individual 
factor variables, are not completely congruent 
with these hypothesis: there is little evidence of 
life cycle effects on the number of patents 
applications that a scientist makes. A strong 
results is instead the positive and significant 
relation between patents and publications. 
In another study which examined patenting 
activity at individual level in a Department of 
MIT, the authors (Agrawal and Henderson, 
2002) found out that disclosures are negatively 
related to age and positively to career stage; but 
the cohort effect is opposite to the hypothesis of 
a “cultural change” in University, since new 
cohort were less oriented to invention disclosure 
to their institutions 
Another study (Wallmark, 1997) describes 
the inventors profiles (age, gender, individual 
patent productivity) at a Sweden University of 
Technology. It is found out that the individual 
patent productivity is unevenly distributed: 75% 
of researchers contribute to 25% of patents 
while the top 10% contribute to 75% of the 
results. The presence of very productive 
individuals should influence the distribution of 
patents among the different schools at the 
technical University: in fact, instead of the 
different size of schools and the different patent 
frequency among industry branches, the 
patenting are evenly distributed among schools. 
Wallmark finds also that the patent production 
curve over the life cycle seems to be the same 
obtained for publication production: an inverse 
U shape over the life cycle. 
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3.3 Scientific incentive versus economic 
incentive 
Does patent production follows the same 
incentives of scientific production, i.e. 
reputation based reward, associated with 
recognition by peers, new position in better 
locations and wage increase? 
Carayol (2004) considers that patents follow 
a slightly different incentive regime, since the 
research leading to high performance in 
publication can be different from the one 
leading to patents (therefore patents are not 
often a by product of publications); and the 
reputational reward of patent may not be 
evaluated in the same way by scientific 
community and not produce the same effect in 
terms of career.  
The question therefore is if and how 
publishing affects patenting. Following Agrawal 
and Henderson (2002), patenting is not affected 
by publishing activity. Carayol (2004) explores 
the non neutrality of publishing, on the basis of 
two different hypothesis: that one may expect a 
positive effect of publication (best researchers 
can exhibit both the best patenting and 
publishing profile) and on the other hand that 
some researchers specialize in patenting. 
His conclusion is that the academic reward 
system doesn’t provide incentives for patenting. 
The reputational reward of patent seems low and 
this is a disincentive for young researcher to 
patent, while older researchers are more 
sensitive to value the application of their 
research and its pay off. In sum, patenting 
should ask for a specific strategy, often in 
collaboration with industry.  
Calderini, Franzoni and Pezzulli (2004) also 
studied the effect of quantity and quality of 
scientific publications over the decision to 
patent, controlling for the effect of personal, 
institutional and environmental characteristics 
by a sample of 1323 Italian public researchers. 
They find that the probability of patenting with 
private company increases with quantity and 
quality of publications, the expertise of TTO and 
the presence of firms in the area of scientist 
location; the probability to patenting depends on 
reputation accumulated along the career, but the 
probability of patenting for a top scientists is 
very low. This can be probably due to the fact 
that top scientists “do not engage in contract 
research because their time is fully financed”. In 
sum the effect of scientific productivity is higher 
than scientific quality on the probability of 
patenting with industry. 
3.4 The role of regulatory framework 
As to the patent regulatory framework (patent 
laws and related administrative regulations), 
some authors (Meyer Kramher and Schomch, 
1998) see it as one important factor explaining 
the different national patterns in university 
patenting. Nevertheless there is a lack of in -
depth study on the national patent laws impact 
on public patenting. An interesting track can be 
found in Harhoff and Hoisl (2004) work on the 
German Employees’ Invention Act and 
particularly on the monetary compensation for 
inventors, that in Germany is regulated by law 
and not (as in other countries, included Italy) by 
negotiations between employer and employee 
inventor. Their study is based on a survey 
collected within the scope of a European project 
(PatVal) started in 2002 and even if it is not 
specifically dedicated to public inventors, it 
gives a good insight into the functioning of a 
patent’s economic compensation scheme and its 
capacity of creating incentive to patent for 
employee inventors.  
Policies on ownership of patent at public 
research organisation are changing within Oecd 
countries and encouraging the ownership of 
invention by the institution where the research 
have been performed. A way for realising these 
change in Europe passed through modifying the 
employment laws, so that university professors 
are not exempted from legislation that gives 
employers the ownership of the intellectual right 
generated by employees.  
In Italy, as presented above, two kinds of 
change, with different rationale, happened in a 
short time: 
- in 2001 (L 383, art 7) the IP title was 
recognised to the individual researcher 
employed by a university or a public 
research organization; as a consequence the 
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public institutions introduced new rules for 
filling the space left by the law to parties’ 
agreement and in particular the possibility 
for the employee researcher of asking the 
employer institution (ex ante or ex post the 
individual patent application) for an 
assignment contract. The new legislation and 
its application gave therefore to the 
individual researcher a large space for 
alternative solutions; 
- in 2005 a new law passed, modifying 
substantially the previous one: it recognises 
the IP ownership to the employer- institution 
in all cases of research contract financed by 
external (private or public) funds. Only in 
case of research activity funded by core fund 
the inventor employee can take the IP title or 
choose the IP assignment contract to its 
institution. In this way Italy backed out and 
followed the general European concern of 
giving greater legal certainty to firms 
interested in exploiting research results. The 
justification of this tendency is that the IP 
ownership to institutions, as opposed to title 
to individual researchers, should low 
transaction costs for industrial partners and 
encourage more formal channels for 
technology transfer (Oecd). This more recent 
regulatory change is not taken into 
consideration in our survey. 
An Oecd study (2002) puts into evidence 
some problem leaved a part from innovation in 
regulation: firstly information on IP policies is 
not well disseminated within the public system 
of research and often institutes or single 
researcher have a very approximate idea of the 
legal framework. Moreover some rules on 
ownership are still lacking or are unclear: the 
case of student or other non faculty members 
inventing at University. 
And, secondly: patent reform are mainly 
based on ownership change, while incentives 
remain more or less the same for public research 
organization. As to researchers, why disclosing 
the invention to the institution instead of directly 
contracting with industry? And why public 
organisations should become more active in 
disclosing, protecting and commercialising 
patent? The incentive side of the institutional 
change in public patenting asks for better 
control. 
4. Data  
The purpose of our analysis was to understand if 
the change in patent regulation for public 
research organizations, and specifically the IP 
title to individual researchers, had found a 
positive acceptance within public researchers. 
Since the new regulation passed in 2001, time 
was too short for finding evidence (increase or 
decrease in yearly patent applications) from 
official patent data. Moreover the new 
legislative regulation has been accompanied by 
new specific administrative regulation, allowing 
researchers a choice among different strategies 
of entitlement and reward, that could not be 
detected from official data.  
We studied the public patenting behaviour at 
individual level through a qualitative survey 
addressed to all the inventors who patented in 
two large public research organizations, the 
University La Sapienza (Roma1) and the 
National Research Council (CNR) in three years 
(2001, 2002, 2003). The 2001 new regulation 
has been adopted later in these institutions: in 
June 2002 by the University Roma1 and in April 
2003 by CNR. In the meanwhile the institutions 
have used the old legislation, taken into account 
that it could be used for inventions done before 
the law. 
The interviews, made by telephone, were 
addressed to the 163 researchers present in the 
patent list of the two institutions, for the period 
2001-2003, some of them with more than one 
patent. The list of patents of the University 
Roma 1 for 2003 was not complete2. The dataset 
has been built on 125 questionnaire filled by 102 
researchers: the same one answered to more 
than one questionnaire when he filed more than 
one patent, both because he co-patented or 
because he had more than one patent in the 
period.  
The distribution of patent by institution and 
date of deposit is in the following table.   
 
 
 
                                                                 
2 Data for 2003 are not complete since information on 
patent application couldn’t be circulated before 18 
monthes by University Roma1 
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 University Roma 1 CNR Total 
2001 43 31 74 
2002 13 21 34 
2003 2* 15 17 
Total 58 67 125 
(*) Information on patent application couldn’t be circulated before 18 months by the University Roma 1 
 
 
Some University researchers has patented 
with CNR within the CNR finalised projects. 
Given this situation and the too recent intra-
institutional regulation we didn’t compare 
different institutional patent regime and in this 
preliminary study we only explore the level of 
information of public researchers on regulation. 
The questionnaire and the dataset contains 
mainly qualitative information on three kinds of 
questions: the individual characteristics of 
researchers with institutional patents and their 
motivation to patent; their level of information 
on the new regulation and their evaluation; the 
orientation towards a more entrepreneurial 
behaviour in patenting. 
5. Results: Descriptive statistics  
The patenting activity has mainly being realised 
following the old patent regime (title to the 
institution), 74.4%; for the 23.2% patents 
following the new patent regime researchers 
have adopted the assignment contract to 
institution (18.4%) and only 4.8% have chosen 
the individual patent entitlement.  
The public inventors informed on the 2001 
patent regulation are 56.8% and on its 
application to the institution are 53.8%. 
The international geographical extension, that 
can be considered an indicator of quality for 
patents, concern 41.9% of all patents.  
The predominant behaviour is co-patenting 
(91.2%), mainly within the same institution 
(59.6%); co-patenting with industry in the 
period represents 7%.  
Around half of researchers has a past 
experience in patenting (59.2%); 40.8% are 
newcomers in patenting. 
Around one third (27.2%) of researchers has 
co-patented or developed a patent with industry 
in the past, mainly at CNR. 
A larger number has professional linkages 
with industry (56%) and in this case there are no 
significant differences between University and 
Cnr.  
Even if the applied type of research prevails 
as the main research activity (54%), also basic 
research as main research activity is largely 
represented (38.4%) and without significant 
differences among the two institutions; 
development (7.2%) has a larger presence as 
main activity at CNR.  
Age and career stage effects 
The cross sectional distribution of patenting 
by age shows a grow with the age of individuals 
and a decline after a peak at 46-55 years, 
probably later than in an age-publishing profile. 
The career stage effect alleges the age patenting 
profile, since at University the tendency is a 
growth in patenting when going from the low to 
the high career positions. Patenting late in career 
can suggest that reputational reward of patent is 
low and this is a disincentive for young 
researchers. 
Cnr represents an anomalous case, where, for 
the absence of a policy of human resources 
valorisation, researchers are for the great 
majority concentrated at the lowest level.  
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Publishing and patenting 
For almost all the researchers, patenting goes 
with publishing (90.2%), it is a product linked to 
publishing. The large presence of engineering 
science and biomedical sciences as scientific 
environment of inventors can allow both 
patented and published results. Patents are 
concentrated in disciplines where there is a low 
marginal cost of producing a patent 
communication. Individuals in these scientific 
environments are, nevertheless, largely oriented 
to give preference to publications. Patents in our 
sample of public inventors look effectively like 
“logical outcome of research activity, that is 
designed first and foremost with an eye to 
publication” (Stephan et al., 2004).  
 
 
Tab. 2 - Main orientation of public inventors 
 N Observations Publishing Patenting No one/Both Total 
University Roma 1 44 50.0% 13.6% 36.4% 100.0 
CNR              42 57.1% 21.4% 21.4% 100.0 
Total 86 53.5% 17.4% 29.1% 100.0 
 
 
 
 
Individual motivation to patent 
The strictly individual motivations (career 
advantage and economic return) have a low 
relevance: they receive mainly low scores; but 
scientific visibility is considered a high 
motivation (2+3 score) by 65% of the inventor-
researchers, confirming our previous result. 
Around the same percentage of inventors 
(62.5%) give a high score to the motivation of 
diversifying scientific production. In sum it 
looks like there is a complementary relation 
between publishing and patenting in our sample  
 
(CNR + University Roma 1 last three years 
patents): researchers who patent are scientists, 
but in the disciplinary environment where more 
patents occur, patenting is not considered as 
crowding out the scientific visibility of 
researchers.  
Motivations related to attracting more 
external resources to research activity receive 
the larger percentage of high score: resources 
arrive through more contracts and collaborations 
with industry (Tab. 3).  
 
 
 
 
Tab. 3 - Motivation for patenting: score 
 N of Obs 0 1 2 3 
No motivation      
Scientific visibility 121 7.4% 27.3% 35.5% 29.8% 
Career advantage 121 38.8% 28.9% 24.8% 7.4% 
Individual economic return 123 47.2% 31.7% 11.4% 9.8% 
Attracting more resources  123 4.1% 9.8% 31.7% 54.5% 
Incrementing collaboration with firms 122 11.5% 13.9% 37.7% 36.9% 
Diversification of output 120 15.0% 22.5% 43.3% 19.2% 
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Tab. 4 - Relevance of institutional factors for patenting decision:  
frequencies and subjective judgement (score) 
 N Obs Yes 0 1 2 3 
The national Patent regulation 125 54.5%     
TTO role 125  35.0% 23.3% 29.2% 12.5% 
Public funding  125  19.0% 25.6% 34.7% 20.7% 
Non academic institutions 125 53.6%     
 
 
Tab. 5 - Type of research activity by discipline 
Factors 
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N. observations 11 18 36 44 26 6 2 7 150* 
Basic research 
 
27.3% 
3 
44.4% 
8 
58.3% 
21 
15.9% 
7 
57.7% 
15 
16.7% 
1 
100% 
2 
0% 
0 
37.9% 
47 
Applied research 
 
72.7% 
8 
44.4% 
8 
36.1% 
13 
75% 
33 
34.6% 
9 
83.3% 
5 
0% 
0 
85.7% 
6 
54.8% 
68 
Development research 
 
0% 
0 
11.2% 
2 
5.6% 
2 
9.1% 
4 
7.7% 
2 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
14.3% 
1 
7.3% 
9 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
* the  inventors could choose two disciplinary areas 
 
 
 
Institutional factors 
Among the institutional factors that can affect 
the propensity to patent in the public research 
institutions we took into consideration:  
- the regulation  
- the disciplinary field of patents 
We dedicate below a specific attention to 
regulation, controlling for disciplinary 
differences: 
- the institutional diversity (institution more 
or less research oriented) 
- the TTO role 
- the public funding supporting collaborative 
research and spin off 
All the institutional factors show a not very 
high relevance: they concern around the half of 
our inventor sample or they register a high score 
(2+3) only by around the half of the same 
sample (Tab. 4). 
The role of disciplines: differences among them 
The inventions in our 2001-2003 list occurred 
mainly in engineering (44), chemistry (36) and 
biological (26) sciences.  
The distribution of research activity by type is 
in table 5. 
Basic research is over the average in 
chemistry, biological sciences and physics. 
Applied research is mainly concentrated in 
materials, engineering and environmental 
sciences.  
Past experience in patenting is over the 
average in physic (almost all the inventors in the 
list) and chemistry sciences (63.9%). 
Past and present collaboration with industry 
in patenting is over the average in physic 
(38.9% of the inventor in the discipline), 
engineering (34.1%) and environmental sciences 
(50%). 
1 
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Differences among discipline look like being 
important, partly reflecting disciplinary 
characteristics and partly the institutional (but it 
can be extended to national) scientific history. In 
physic and chemistry, where basic research is 
relevant, there is also an important patent 
heritage (tab. 6). 
Professional linkages with industry is more 
diffused (56% of the sample) than patenting 
with industry (27.2%) and it is over the average 
in engineering (77.3%), environmental (66.7%) 
and chemistry sciences (58.3%).  
 
Regulation: how many public inventors know 
the regulation  
There is no relation among attributing relevance 
to the role of a national patent regulation and 
being informed, while there is a relation 
between information on the new patent law and 
its institutional application (tab. 7). 
Only around one half of inventors are 
informed about the new patent regulation and on 
its institutional application. 
There are differences in information among 
disciplines: the more up to date are physic 
scientists in our sample: 94.4% know the new 
norm and 83% the institutional application. Well 
informed on the 2001 law are also scientists in 
material sciences, but they know less the 
institutional application (tab. 8).  
The relevance of a patent regulation for 
patenting activity is specially recognised in 
materials, environmental, biological and 
chemistry sciences, but only scientists in 
materials, chemistry and physic sciences 
attribute an over the average (55.4%) positive 
role to regulation in reducing uncertainty and 
attributing value to public patenting. 
 
 
Tab. 6 - Patenting behaviour by discipline 
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N. observations 11 18 36 44 26 6 2 7 150* 
Past experience in patenting 
 
36.4% 
 
94.4% 
 
63.9% 
 
56.8% 
 
38.5% 
 
33.3% 
 
0 
 
100% 
 
59,2% 
74 
Patent with firms 
 
18.2% 
 
38.9% 
 
27.8% 
 
34.1% 
 
19.2% 
 
50% 
 
0 
 
28.6% 
 
27.2% 
34 
Links with industries 
 
18.2% 
 
44.4% 
 
58.3% 
 
77.3% 
 
30.8% 
 
66.7% 
 
0 
 
100% 
 
56% 
69 
*the inventors could choose two disciplinary areas 
 
 
 
Tab. 7 - Attribution of a relevant role to regulation and level of information 
Test of statistical significance (Pearson Chi -Square) 
 Value df Asymp. 
Sig. 
Relevant role for regulation and information on the 
new patent law  4.649 2 0.98 
 Relevant role for regulation and information on the 
new institutional application 1.676 2 0.433 
Information on the new patent law and on the new 
institutional application 89.714* 1 0.000 
*statistically significant relationship among the variables. 
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Tab. 8 - Role of patent regulation and level information by discipline 
Factors 
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N observations 11 18 36 44 26 6 2 7 150* 
Relevant role of the patent 
regulation 3.3% 
50% 
 
71.4% 
 
27.3% 
 
80.8% 
 
83.3% 
 
100% 
 
85.7% 
 
54.5% 
67 
National patent regulation 
reduces uncertainty  
3% 
 
61.5% 
 
70.8% 
 
35.7% 
 
42.9% 
 
40% 
 
0 
 
100% 
 
55.4% 
41 
Informed on new patent law 45.5%  
94.4% 
 
58.3% 
 
47.7% 
 
57.7% 
 
50% 
 
100% 
 
71.4% 
 
56.8% 
71 
Informed on the new patent 
law application in the 
institution 
40% 
 
83.3% 
 
55.9% 
 
52.5% 
 
57.7% 
 
33.3% 
 
100% 
 
57.1% 
 
53.8% 
64 
* the inventors could choose two disciplinary area 
 
 
Economic incentives: what does encourage 
scientists to patent? 
We explore the propensity of public inventors 
towards a higher but more uncertain economic 
return. The patent regulation recognises a prime 
for patenting to the inventors when the IP title is 
to the institutions, while when the title is to 
inventors there is no more prime and the 
inventor/owner must transfer to the institution a 
quota of its return from the IP 
commercialisation. In both the cases the 
economic return depends on the market success 
of the invention, and in both the case a 
collaboration between researcher and institution 
can be present, but in the case of title to inventor 
he has larger responsibility together with larger 
return. There is room for exploring the scientists 
interest to change towards larger but more risky 
return in patenting.  
Scientists in our sample show a prevailing 
“conservative” attitude: 51.8% is in favour of 
the “equo premio” regime. Nonetheless a good 
38.4% is in favour of a more high and risky 
economic return and this attitude is slightly 
more present among university scientists (tab. 
9).  
We explored which factor can have an impact 
on this different attitude.  
Only age, career stage and type of research 
have a statistically significant relation with the 
preference for more high and risky economic 
return: nor the collaboration with industry in 
patenting, neither the main orientation toward 
patenting instead of publishing, neither the non 
academic institution (Cnr), or the experience in 
past patenting (tab. 10).  
It seems to emerge a profile of young 
researcher, at the beginning of his career and 
working in more applied oriented research, who 
should be more oriented towards a more risky 
behaviour. We will explore better the 
composition of our sample by homogeneous 
groups and their relative weight below by a 
cluster analysis.  
Tab. 9 - Attitude towards the economic return to inventors 
 University Cnr Total 
Low and established economic return  22 
44.4% 
34 
58.6% 
58 
51.8% 
High and risky economic return 23 
42.6% 
20 
34.5% 
43 
38.4% 
Doesn’t know 7 13% 
4 
6.9% 
11 
9.8% 
Total  54 
100% 
58 
100% 
112 
100% 
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Tab. 10 - Individual and institutional factors influencing the attitude towards a high and risky 
return to inventor 
Factors Mode Value df Asymp. 
Sig. 
Age  36-45 10.146* 3 0.017 
Career stage low/starting 
(researcher) 
6.115* 2 0.047 
Institution  University 0.778 1 0.378 
Academic attitude 
(preference for publication) 
No academic 3.438 1 0.064 
Patent with firms No 0.966 1 0.326 
Kind of research applied research 9.940* 1 0.007 
Informed on the new patent 
regulation 
Yes (56.8%) 0.099 1 0.753 
Past experience in patenting Yes (51%) 1.019 1 0.313 
 
 
Evaluation of the new patent regime 
The main advantage attributed to the new patent 
regime (title to individual inventor) by informed 
researchers is the opportunity of an economic 
exploitation of patent, but the average score 
given to the scientific visibility is not so far: the 
attribution of title to the individuals is 
considered to produce higher visibility. 
Moreover this answer reinforces what we wrote 
above: in the scientific environment where 
patenting is more diffused, scientific visibility 
goes with patenting (tab. 11).  
The main disadvantage is considered the 
higher constraints imposed by institutions in the 
application of the new regime. As we underlined 
above, the new patent regime introduced/ 
reinforced a problem of moral hazard in the 
relation between inventor and institutions and a 
selective attitude by Patent Office towards the 
IP assignment on inventions. At the second 
place is the cost –opportunity disadvantage in 
terms of time to be dedicated to marketing 
patents.  
Asking more directly why choosing the 
individual IPR title, we collected a very low 
number of answers, even if higher than the 
number of inventors who chose it, and 
“autonomy” in patent managing received the 
highest score (tab. 12). 
Asking directly why going for an IPR 
assignment contract to the institution, we 
received a number of answer lightly higher than 
the number of inventors who did it and the lack 
of expertise was the reason with the highest 
score (tab. 13). 
 
Patenting with firms: what does firm trust more, 
individuals or institutions? 
One of the justification for giving the IPR title 
to institutions is that firms trust more to treat 
with institution when contracting patent 
licenses; on the other side there is the 
justification of the reduction of risk of firms 
opportunistic behaviour towards single 
inventors. Our sample of inventors answered 
differently to the question “On your experience, 
do firms prefer to establish the relation with the 
researcher or with the institution” distinguishing 
by (research and service) contract and (research) 
project and by the old regime (title to institution) 
and the new one (title to inventor).  
The distinction allowed us to separate the 
important phenomenon of individual 
consultancies from research projects. We got a 
limited number of answers, around the number 
of the event of patenting with industry, but very 
convergent: even if slightly lower for research 
projects, the large majority indicates the direct 
relation with researchers as the preferred one by 
firms. Of course this result leaves open the 
possibility of firm opportunistic behaviour 
toward individuals (tab. 14).  
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Tab. 11 - Advantages and disadvantages of the new patent regime 
 
ADVANTAGES N Obs. Min Max Mean St. Deviation 
Economic return  72 0 3 1.57 0.81 
Autonomy of patent 
management  
72 0 3 1.46 0.71 
Opportunity of economic 
exploitation  
72 0 3 1.72 0.74 
Scientific visibility 71 0 3 1.61 0.62 
DISADVANTAGES      
Economic costs 72 0 3 1.25 0.52 
Excessive time for 
managing patents 
72 0 3 1.61 0.74 
Lack of expertises 71 0 3 1.28 0.48 
Higher constraints imposed 
by the institution 70 0 3 1.90 0.76 
Note: the inventors were asked to give a score from 0 to 3 (0 min, 3 max) for each  advantage and disadvantage   
 
 
Tab. 12 - Motivation for choosing the IPR individual entitlement 
Factors N Obs Min Max Mean St. Deviation 
Economic return 16 0 3 2.25 0.86 
Autonomy of patent 
management 16 0 3 2.44 0.96 
Opportunity of economic 
exploitation 16 0 3 1.69 0.95 
 
Tab. 13 - Motivation for doing an assignment contract to institution 
Factors N Obs Min Max Mean St. Deviation 
Economic costs 31 0 3 2.03 1.02 
Excessive time for 
managing patents 31 0 3 2.16 0.82 
Lack of expertises 31 0 3 2.23 0.88 
 
 
 
Tab. 14 - A direct relation with researchers or with institution: what do firms prefer better, by type 
of link and type of patent regime 
 N of Observations Individuals Institutions 
Old Regime: contracts 39 87.2% 12.8% 
Old Regime: projects 40 72.5% 27.5% 
New regime: contracts 30 86.7% 13.3% 
New Regime: projects 32 68.8% 31.3% 
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6. Multivariate analysis 
In order to understand how our sample of 
inventors should adapt to the patent regime 
change, we reduced the 125 cases into three 
internally homogeneous groups. 
First of all we reduced the variables into 
principal factors. Dealing with categories, we 
chose a multiple correspondence analysis 
(ACM) for the application of factorial method. 
The ACM allows to synthesize several variables 
into few factors that represent some 
combinations among variables and are able to 
explain the maximum of variance and to 
minimize the loss of information. See 
methodological annex. 
The first two factorial axes explain 74% of 
the total variance (49% the first axis and 25% 
the second axis).  
Variables which contribute more to the 
formation of the axis 1 (see also the 
methodological annex) are information on new 
patent regime and on its application, and 
experience (patent in the past and patent with 
firms). 
Variables which contribute more to the 
formation of the axis 2 are professional linkages 
with industry and role attributed to patent 
regulation (Axis 1). 
The interpretation of the Axis 1 can be 
summarised as “Information with patent 
experience-Lack of information and new comer 
in patenting” and analysing the relative 
contribution of the illustrative variables, the best 
represented ones are in Axis 1(1). 
The interpretation of Axis 2 can be 
summarised as “Direct relation with industry 
and low role attributed to patent regulation-No 
relation with industry and high role attributed to 
patent regulation”. The best represented 
illustrative variables are in Axis 2. 
 
Axis 1  
 Negative semi axis Positive semi axis 
Information on new regulation Informed   -8.05 Not informed  8.65 
Information on new regulation 
applied in institution Informed   -7.67 Not informed  8.46 
Patents in the past Yes        -6.72 No          7.10 
Patents with industry  Yes        -5.99 No          6.44 
Axis 2   
Relevant role of patent regulation Relevant   -6.57 Not Relevant  8.08 
Professional linkages with industry  No Linkages –5.12 Linkages     6.0 
 
 
Axis 1(1) 
Informed and with 
experience in patenting 
age 46-55 working at CNR   
Not informed and new 
comer in patenting age under 35 working at University biological sciences gender: female 
 
 
Axis 2 
Direct relation with industry 
and low role attributed to 
patent regulation 
age 46-55 high career stage engineering sciences 
No relation with industry 
and high role attributed to 
patent regulation 
age 36-45 low career stage  
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7. Cluster analysis 
We reduced the 125 cases into clusters with the 
lowest internal heterogeneity, positioned in the 
space defined by the two factorial axes, through 
a hierarchical cluster analysis (See 
methodological annex). 
The sample can be reorganized in three 
groups. The first cluster explains 41% of the 
cases; the second cluster, coming from a 
division of the first one, explains 18% and the 
third one explains 41% of the sample. The 
categories better defining the clusters, compared 
with their percent value in the sample, and the 
weight of each cluster by these categories, allow 
the following interpretation: 
Cluster 1 regroups inventors with a good 
information, both on the new patent regime and 
on its application (around 70% of these 
categories is in this group); they attribute a 
relevant role to regulation for patenting and 
specifically to its contribution in reducing 
uncertainty and giving recognition to public 
patent (70.7% of this category is reproduced in 
cluster 1). These inventors haven’t linkages with 
industry and co-patent with other public 
institutions (70.8% of this category in this 
cluster). 87.5% of inventors in physic science is 
in this cluster. 
Cluster 2, which is a component of the cluster 1, 
regroups inventors informed on the new patent 
regime, who nonetheless don’t attribute a high 
role to regulation; they have experience in 
patenting and linkages with industry; and are 
mainly involved in applied research activity; 
42.5% of inventors in engineering science is in 
this cluster. The orientation toward the 
economic return to patent contribute (78%) to 
define this group profile, who has a 
“conservative” attitude, being in favour of a low 
and established return 
Cluster 3 regroups inventors who have not 
information on the new patent regime, new 
comers in patenting, working at University 
(53.4% of the category is in the cluster) and 
involved in basic research (56.2 of this category 
is represented by this cluster).  
The three groups in our sample are different 
type of inventors: a large group that represents 
the core of public inventors, who have a 
tradition of patenting and where publishing and 
patenting go together, even in absence of 
relation with industry. The core of this core 
group is the community of Physic science 
researchers, who traditionally represent the 
excellence group of scientist in Italy and whose 
attitude is to look at patent regulation as a useful 
and known instrument, which they draw for co-
patenting with other public scientists. 
Within this large group of informed 
individuals, there is a subgroup with a different 
attitude: they have experience in patenting, but 
don’t attribute an incentive role to the patent 
regulation, even in the new innovative version, 
which attributes title to inventors. In fact the 
average attitude towards the economic benefit 
for the inventors is largely “conservative”. 
These inventors prefer the traditional prime 
(equo premio), without developing new 
entrepreneurial behaviour. The core of this 
inventors is represented by the engineering 
scientific community, who has good linkages 
with industry: they co-patent with firms and 
mostly have professional linkages with industry. 
There is then a large group of new comer 
inventors, without past experience and without 
information on the patent regulation; they are 
not characterised by age or discipline, neither 
have a common attitude towards the economic 
return to inventors. What is their common 
character, present in this group more then on the 
average (sample) is doing basic research at 
university.  
8. Conclusion  
Our exploratory work is based on an empirical 
approach, mainly qualitative at present, whose 
aim was to look at the patent production of 
public research institution from the side of 
individual inventors. The starting idea was to 
understand if there was ground for the new 2001 
national patent regime, which for the first time 
in our country gave autonomy and responsibility 
to public inventors. Italy, differently from 
Germany, has not experience of title to 
inventors, but, as France, registers an interesting 
phenomenon of scientist inventing out of the 
public institutions. Our investigation is of course 
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biased, since we only took into consideration 
inventors who patented within their institution. 
We wondered if in this specific environment 
there were signal of a new orientation, more 
individually based, to patent. It was also the 
occasion for controlling the relation between the 
traditional scientific incentive and the patenting 
behaviour.  
The limit of our analysis is certainly the size 
of the sample, reduced in terms of years and 
institutions. Nonetheless we obtained some 
interesting results. First of all, working on 
multidisciplinary institutions and using a cluster 
analysis, we learnt that disciplines count very 
much and that reasoning at aggregate and 
average level can drive to unclear results. In our 
sample the attitude of physic scientists towards 
regulation is different from that of engineering, 
even if both patent within the public institutions. 
The aggregate result can depend on the size of 
the different scientific communities within a 
national public research system. Following the 
same line of thought, it is not correct to 
generalise the relevance of the relation with 
industry for public patenting. What is a strong 
result of our analysis is the complementary 
relation of patenting and publishing. In this case 
different scientific communities arrive to a 
convergent attitude, through different paths and 
it is not necessary to extend one path to all the 
other scientific environments. Engineering 
scientists have a tradition of relation with 
industry and this is the base for patenting, they 
have more opportunities to patent coming from 
these relations, but physic scientists consider 
patent as another way for getting scientific 
visibility, which doesn’t crowd out their 
reputation. What probably is relevant, but it  
needs more control, is the cost opportunity of 
patenting. Patents are probably more 
concentrated in those communities where there 
are more opportunities, but also where this cost 
is low, where patent communication and 
publication are not too far. A strong motivation 
for patenting indicated by researchers is the 
attractiveness of market resources to research 
activity which come with patenting. This is also 
a subject which should need more control and it 
could be done also at individual researcher level.  
Looking at the question of scientific versus 
economic incentive, a not marginal part of our 
sample should be oriented towards a more 
entrepreneurial attitude and toward higher and 
risky return from patenting: they are new 
comers to patenting, young researchers, at early 
stage in career. Therefore they represent a not 
stabilized group, whose motivation can be 
mainly influenced by the still weak position in 
the institutions. For the remaining sample, 
scientists, in all disciplines, are very much 
institutionally oriented: the majority preferred to 
assign the title to the institution and are 
“conservative” in terms of economic return. 
This is an interesting result for many reasons. 
When we looked at single institutional factor 
having an impact on the sample of public 
inventors, we found out that nor the role of 
TTO, neither the public funding for 
collaborative research and spin off, nor the 
institution (more or less academic) had 
relevance. But individual scientist behaviour is 
an outcome deriving also from his institutional 
environment and this is why, if we look, as we 
did, at a sample of public scientist patenting 
within their institution, we easily find a common 
term in their behaviour. In our case it is the 
generalised distance from a more risky attitude 
towards marketing their invention. 
Given that, the research policy question could 
be: what kind of regime or factor could increase 
the present favourable attitude toward patenting 
in patenting scientific communities and how to 
promote new entries from other scientific fields? 
Our analysis at present doesn’t allow an answer, 
that should be searched looking at the relation 
between patent productivity and 
individual/institutional factors. What our 
analysis allow us to say  is that legal regulation 
and its application doesn’t seem very relevant in 
relation to the practice of patenting. Half of the 
patenting scientists of our sample had a practice 
of patenting separated from the awareness of 
their duty and right. Most of them, the not 
informed scientists, are patenting for the first 
time and interestingly they are mostly at 
university, which is really a new comer 
institution in patenting. But probably the attitude 
of the old patenting scientists, such as 
engineering scientists, who are informed about 
the new legislation, but don’t attribute relevance 
to it, depends on the long history of public 
patenting in Italy and specifically in the public 
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research institutions, with a very poor patent 
legislation.  
The 2001 patent regulation innovated more 
than it can appear, since,  arriving in a time of 
attention to the technology transfer service by 
public institutions, produced a rich body of 
internal regulations. These applied regulations, 
which need a specific attention, opened the road 
to a range of autonomous patent strategy for 
researchers. They created also room for 
developing more trust relation between 
institution and its researchers along with risk of 
opportunistic behaviour. But this story, which 
was just beginning and which was not easy to 
forecast, since asked for totally new behaviour 
from individual researchers (autonomy and 
responsibility in market activity), will not be 
written. In fact in 2005 the rules have changed 
again. The new patent regulation gives the title 
of all the invention coming from externally 
funded research, and developed within a public 
institute, to the institution, leaving to the 
researcher the possibility of a title only for 
research funded by the  intra-institution source. 
In this way the possibility of differentiation of 
behaviour within researchers is strongly 
reduced, in favour of a more controlled relation 
with external actors, who are relevant source of 
fund for the public institutions.  
In the future, together with the extension of 
our sample, for better controlling the role of 
different institutions, we intend to explore more 
in depth the impact of specific internal patent 
regulation on public scientist patenting 
behaviour, the relation between scientific results 
and patenting and finally we should develop a 
cost-benefit analysis of the public patenting 
policy.  
Methodological Annex 
ACM analysis 
 
The ACM has been realized distinguishing the variables as follows: 
 
Active variables (directly contributing to define the factors) 
1. previous patents (yes/no) 
2. patent with firms (yes/no) 
3. links with industries (yes/no) 
4. type of research (basic/applied) 
5. academic/non academic orientation 
6. economic return to inventors (certain/uncertain) 
7. relevant role of national patent regulation (yes/no) 
8. patent regulation reduces uncertainty and give recognition to public patent (yes/no) 
9. information on the new patent regime (yes/no) 
10. information on the new patent regime application in the institution (yes/no) 
 
Illustrative variables (they don’t contribute to factors’ formation, but help to their interpretation) 
1. age 
2. gender 
3. stage career 
4. institution 
5. type of co-patenting 
6. discipline 
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At first it also other variables have been taken into consideration, but then they have been 
rejected, because they got over the value test. In particular, the active variables have been chosen 
with a contribution of 4.8 (100/21 variables) and the illustrative ones with a value test of 2%, for 
each factor.  
We examined the first two factors that both explain the 36% of variance. This percent could seem 
low, but the ACM transforms the factors’ categories into single variables and it involves a 
proliferation of the number of variables and therefore a several number of extractable factors. 
With Benzecrì’s formula, the variance explained from the first factors has been re-valued so that 
the first two explain the 74% of variance (the first factor explains 49% and the second 25%). 
Benzecrì, to whom it is attributed the paternity of the ACM, proposes an “optimistic” formula that 
considers only the eigenvalues above the ratio1/p (where p is the number of variables), to revalue the 
explained variance.  
In this work the 1/p ratio is 0.045 (1/22), and it includes the first ten factors. Now, following 
Benzecrì, we weigh the relevant eigenvalues (the first 10) raising to square the differences between 
the originals eigenvalues and the constant 1/p; we compute again the percent of variance explained 
summarizing the relevant eigenvalues and referring each eigenvalue to this new total.  
 
 
Table of eigenvalues 
Trace of the matrix:                1.26736     0.0944 
N Eigenvalues Percent Cumulative Percent 
Eigenvalues 
Re-valued 
Percent 
1 0.2588 20.42 20.42 0.0457 48.4 
2 0.1982 15.64 36.06 0.0235 24.9 
3 0.1452 11.46 47.52 0.0100 10.6 
4 0.1257 9.92 57.44 0.0065 6.9 
5 0.1110 8.76 66.20 0.0043 4.5 
6 0.0918 7.25 73.44 0.0022 2.3 
7 0.0905 7.14 80.58 0.0021 2.2 
8 0.0719 5.67 86.25 0.0001 0.2 
9 0.0580 4.57 90.83 0.0000 0.00 
10 0.0465 3.67 94.50 0.0000 0.00 
11 0.0403 3.18 97.68 0.0000 0.00 
12 0.0170 1.35 99.02 0.0000 0.00 
13 0.0065 0.52 99.54 0.0000 0.00 
14 0.0039 0.31 99.85 0.0000 0.00 
15 0.0019 0.15 100.00 0.0000 0.00 
16 0.0000 0.00 100.00 0.0000 0.00 
17 0.0000 0.00 100.00 0.0000 0.00 
18 0.0000 0.00 100.00 0.0000 0.00 
19 0.0000 0.00 100.00 0.0000 0.00 
20 0.0000 0.00 100.00 0.0000 0.00 
21 0.0000 0.00 100.00 0.0000 0.00 
22 0.0000 0.00 100.00 0.0000 0.00 
 
 
Finally, the variables have been placed on positive and negative semi-axes following the sign (+, -) 
of their coordinates. 
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Description of axis 1 
ACTIVE VARIABLES 
Variable’s label Category’s label Value-Test Loads 
Negative semi-axis    
information on new regulation knows new regulation -8.05 71.000 
information on new regulation applied in 
institution knows new regulation applied in institution -7.67 64.000 
previous patents yes previous patents -6.72 74.000 
patent with firms yes patent with firms -5.99 34.000 
type of research activity applied research -5.02 68.000 
links with industries yes links with industries -5.01 70.000 
CENTRAL AREA     
Positive semi-axis    
type of research activity basic research 5.02 48.000 
links with industries no links with industries 5.44 55.000 
patent with firms no patent with firms 6.44 91.000 
previous patents no previous patents 7.10 51.000 
information on new regulation applied in 
institution 
not knows new regulation applied in 
institution 
8.46 55.000 
information on new regulation not knows new regulation 8.65 54.000 
 
 
ILLUSTRATIVE VARIABLES 
Variable’s label Category’s label Valeu-Test Loads 
Negative semi-axis    
age from 46 to 55 -3.02 51.000 
institution Cnr -2.08 67.000 
CENTRAL AREA     
Positive semi-axis    
discipline 1 medicine 2.02 9.000 
gender female 2.04 20.000 
type of co-patenting University- Cnr 2.14 15.000 
institution university 2.52 58.000 
age until 35 2.56 13.000 
discipline 1 biological sciences  2.93 21.000 
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Description of axis 2 
 
ACTIVE VARIABLES 
Variable’s label Category’s label Value-Test Loads 
Negative semi-axis    
role of patent regulation relevant -6.57 67.000 
regulation reduce uncertainty public patent yes  -5.65 41.000 
links with industries no links with industries -5.12 55.000 
information new patent regulation knows new regulation -4.83 71.000 
Information regulation applied in institution knows regulation in institution -4.68 64.000 
economic treatment for inventors higher economic return  -3.90 43.000 
patent with firms no patent with firms -3.44 91.000 
CENTRAL AREA     
Positive semi-axis    
economic treatment’s inventors limited and certain return  4.10 58.000 
information new regulation in institution not knows regulation in institution 4.41 55.000 
patent with firms yes patent with firms 4.43 34.000 
Information new patent regulation not knows new patent regulation  5.84 54.000 
links with industries yes links with industries 6.00 70.000 
role of patent regulation not relevant role 8.08 38.000 
 
ILLUSTRATIVE VARIABLES 
 
Variable’s label Category’s label Value-Test Loads 
Negative semi-axis    
age da 36 a 45 -4.18 32.000 
stage career low-researcher -3.78 47.000 
discipline 1 physic sciences -3.16 14.000 
discipline 1 biological sciences  -3.06 21.000 
kind of co-patenting other public institutions -2.80 24.000 
CENTRAL AREA     
Positive semi-axis    
kind of collaboration privates 2.72 7.000 
age from 46 to 55 3.27 51.000 
gender male 3.31 105.000 
discipline 1 engineering sciences 5.43 40.000 
stage career High: professor or research director 5.55 39.000 
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Cluster analysis 
After reducing the variables in principal factors by ACM, we did a cluster analysis, or the reduction 
of the cases in groups, placed in the space delimitated by the factorial axes.. The aim of the cluster 
analysis is to minimize heterogeneity between individuals within groups and to maximize the 
heterogeneity between the groups. 
The analysis has been realized using the software Spad 5 applied to the previous ACM. It has 
been used the Hierarchical Cluster.  
For defining the clusters we need to consider several values together. First of all we need to 
observe how each categories contribute to define the cluster by its percent in the cluster (column a); 
than we need to compare this value with the percent in the survey (column b); finally, we need to 
observe how the cluster reproduces the category and so how the category divides itself among the 
clusters (column c). 
Cutting the dendogram in different points, the best division was the one with three groups, mainly 
characterized by their position on the first factor. 
The first cluster explains 41% of the cases and it is placed on the third quadrant, so it is on the 
negative semi-axis of the first factor and on the negative semi-axis of the second factor. 
 
 
 
Cluster 1 / 3 (cases: 51 - Percent: 40.80) a b c    
Variable’s label Category’s label 
% 
category 
in the 
cluster 
% 
category 
in the 
sample 
% cluster 
in 
category 
Value-
Test Probability Poids 
information new patent 
regulation knows new regulation 98.04 56.80 70.42 8.26 0.000 71 
new regulation in institution knows new regulation in 
institution 
92.16 51.20 73.44 7.86 0.000 64 
role of patent regulation high 80.39 53.60 61.19 4.92 0.000 67 
patent regulation reduce 
uncertainty 
yes  56.86 32.80 70.73 4.58 0.000 41 
discipline 1 physics sciences 23.53 11.20 85.71 3.37 0.000 14 
kind of co patenting with other public institutions 33.33 19.20 70.83 3.09 0.001 24 
links with industries no links with industries 60.78 44.00 56.36 2.96 0.002 55 
          
links with industries yes links with industries 39.22 56.00 28.57 -2.96 0.002 70 
stage career professor or research 
director 
15.69 31.20 20.51 -2.98 0.001 39 
discipline 1 engineering sciences 11.76 32.00 15.00 -3.98 0.000 40 
role of patent regulation low 5.88 30.40 7.89 -5.06 0.000 38 
information new regulation 
in institution 
no information 7.84 44.00 7.27 -6.96 0.000 55 
information on new patent 
regulation 
not knows new regulation 1.96 43.20 1.85 -8.26 0.000 54 
institution other 0.00 0.00 0.00 -99.99 0.000 0 
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The second cluster explains the 18% of the cases and it is placed into the second quadrant, so it is 
on the negative semi-axis of the first factor and on the positive semi-axis of the second factor. 
 
 
Cluster: 2 / 3  (cases: 23 - Percent: 18.40) a b c    
Variable’s label Category’s label 
% 
category 
in the 
cluster 
% 
category 
in sample 
% cluster 
in 
category 
Value-
Test Probability Poids 
patent with firms yes patent with firms 82.61 27.20 55.88 6.06 0.000 34 
role of patent regulation low 78.26 30.40 47.37 5.09 0.000 38 
links with industries yes links with industries 100.00 56.00 32.86 5.04 0.000 70 
previous patents yes previous patents 100.00 59.20 31.08 4.74 0.000 74 
discipline 1 engineering sciences 73.91 32.00 42.50 4.39 0.000 40 
research activity applied research 91.30 54.40 30.88 3.93 0.000 68 
economic treatment for 
inventors 
limited and certain return  78.26 46.40 31.03 3.20 0.001 58 
information on new legal 
system 
knows new legal system 86.96 56.80 28.17 3.14 0.001 71 
age from 46 to 55 69.57 40.80 31.37 2.86 0.002 51 
          
discipline 1 biological sciences  0.00 16.80 0.00 -2.36 0.009 21 
information on new legal 
system 
not knows new legal system 13.04 43.20 5.56 -3.14 0.001 54 
research activity basic research 8.70 38.40 4.17 -3.21 0.001 48 
new regulation in institution not known 13.04 44.00 5.45 -3.22 0.001 55 
patent regulation reduce 
uncertainty yes  4.35 32.80 2.44 -3.27 0.001 41 
economic treatment of 
inventors 
higher economic return 4.35 34.40 2.33 -3.43 0.000 43 
role of patent regulation high 13.04 53.60 4.48 -4.21 0.000 67 
previous patents no previous patents 0.00 40.80 0.00 -4.74 0.000 51 
links with industries no links with industries 0.00 44.00 0.00 -5.04 0.000 55 
patent with firms no patent with firms 17.39 72.80 4.40 -6.06 0.000 91 
institution other 0.00 0.00 0.00 -99.99 0.000 0 
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The third cluster explains the 41% of the cases and it is placed on the first quadrant, so it is on 
both positive semi-axis of factors.  
 
 
 
 
 
Cluster: 3 / 3  (cases: 51 - Percent: 40.80) a b c    
Variable’s label Category’s label 
% 
category 
in the 
cluster 
% 
category 
in sample 
%  
cluster in 
category 
Value-
Test Probability Poids 
information on new 
regulation not informed 98.04 43.20 92.59 11.10 0.000 54 
information on new 
regulation in institution 
not informed  94.12 44.00 87.27 9.86 0.000 55 
previous patents no previous patents 62.75 40.80 62.75 3.98 0.000 51 
patent with firms no patent with firms 86.27 72.80 48.35 2.67 0.004 91 
research activity basic research 52.94 38.40 56.25 2.58 0.005 48 
institution university 60.78 46.40 53.45 2.50 0.006 58 
                
institution Cnr 39.22 53.60 29.85 -2.50 0.006 67 
discipline 1 physic sciences 1.96 11.20 7.14 -2.60 0.005 14 
patent with firms yes patent with firms 13.73 27.20 20.59 -2.67 0.004 34 
previous patents yes previous patents 37.25 59.20 25.68 -3.98 0.000 74 
new legal system in 
institution 
informed 0.00 51.20 0.00 -10.34 0.000 64 
information on new legal 
system 
informed 1.96 56.80 1.41 -11.10 0.000 71 
institution other 0.00 0.00 0.00 -99.99 0.000 0 
  
The third group collect inventors from university, who develop based research activities, they are 
not informed on the new patent regime, haven’t previous patents and haven’t co-patented with firms.  
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